Tracking rendition aircraft as a way to understand CIA secret detention and torture in Europe by Raphael, Sam et al.
This article was downloaded by: [Kingston University Library]
On: 03 July 2015, At: 08:28
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG
Click for updates
The International Journal of Human
Rights
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjhr20
Tracking rendition aircraft as a way to
understand CIA secret detention and
torture in Europe
Sam Raphaela, Crofton Blackb, Ruth Blakeleyc & Steve Kostasd
a Department of Politics and International Relations, Kingston
University, UK
b Reprieve, London, UK
c School of Politics and IR, University of Kent, UK
d Open Society Justice Initiative, New York, USA
Published online: 19 Jun 2015.
To cite this article: Sam Raphael, Crofton Black, Ruth Blakeley & Steve Kostas (2015): Tracking
rendition aircraft as a way to understand CIA secret detention and torture in Europe, The
International Journal of Human Rights, DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2015.1044772
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2015.1044772
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. Taylor & Francis, our agents,
and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,
completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Versions of published
Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open articles and Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open
Select articles posted to institutional or subject repositories or any other third-party
website are without warranty from Taylor & Francis of any kind, either expressed
or implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of merchantability, fitness for a
particular purpose, or non-infringement. Any opinions and views expressed in this article
are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by
Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be
independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor & Francis shall not be
liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,
and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in
connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
 
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
 
It is essential that you check the license status of any given Open and Open
Select article to confirm conditions of access and use.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
ing
sto
n U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
8:2
8 0
3 J
uly
 20
15
 
Tracking rendition aircraft as a way to understand CIA secret detention
and torture in Europe
Sam Raphaela*, Crofton Blackb, Ruth Blakeleyc and Steve Kostasd
aDepartment of Politics and International Relations, Kingston University, UK; bReprieve, London,
UK; cSchool of Politics and IR, University of Kent, UK; dOpen Society Justice Initiative, New York,
USA
We examine how the tracking of rendition aircraft has provided a much fuller
understanding of the CIA’s rendition, detention and interrogation programme. In
particular, we show how this illuminated the role played by European states. Through
various investigative methods, new rendition aircraft were identiﬁed, signiﬁcant
amounts of ﬂight data were gathered, and data on all known and suspected rendition
ﬂights were collated into one public, searchable database. We show that examining
logistical elements of covert programmes can prove fruitful for security and human
rights research. Furthermore, we demonstrate the beneﬁts of close academic–
practitioner collaboration in the ﬁeld of human rights.
Keywords: rendition; secret detention; torture; CIA; human rights
Introduction
On 24 July 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered landmark judg-
ments in two related cases regarding CIA rendition, secret detention and torture. In both
cases, lawyers for prisoners who are now held in Guantánamo Bay – Abd al-Rahim al-
Nashiri and Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) – had alleged that
their clients were secretly detained in Poland during 2002 and 2003, where they were
repeatedly tortured by the CIA. The court found that these allegations were ‘sufﬁciently
convincing’ and accepted the applicants’ accounts as established ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’. It also found that Poland itself had ‘known of the nature and purposes of the
CIA’s activities on its territory’, and had ‘cooperated in the preparation and execution of
the CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations’.1 As a result, the court
found Poland to have violated multiple articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR): namely, Article 2 (right to life); Article 3 (prohibition of torture);
Article 5 (right to liberty and security); Article 6 (right to a fair trial); Article 8 (right to
respect for private and family life); and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).2
These judgments represented the ﬁrst time that a court had established beyond doubt
that European territory had been used in the War on Terror to house so-called ‘black
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
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sites’: secret prisons built and run by the CIA with the acquiescence of host governments,
wherein prisoners were held secretly for months or years on end, without access to legal
representation or other contact with the outside world. These black sites existed alongside
a series of prisons run by local security forces, which were either secret themselves or which
otherwise housed secret prisoners detained in the War on Terror. In such cases, the CIA
transferred prisoners into and out of the sites, and was granted access to those detained
within, while prison security and interrogations were overseen by local forces. The CIA’s
rendition, detention and interrogation (RDI) programme provided the overarching frame-
work for the establishment and operation of this secret prison network, which operated
at numerous locations across four continents, and encompassed the detention of at least
119 terror suspects during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the War on Terror.3 These prisoners were
held incommunicado, in conditions which amounted to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment, and subjected to a regime of interrogation practices which, employed
together and in many cases individually, clearly constituted torture.4 Indeed, recent and
further details of the treatment of these prisoners, contained within the December 2014 pub-
lication of a redacted version of the 499-page executive summary of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence’s study into the CIA’s programme (hereafter the SSCI report),
demonstrates deﬁnitively that many were subjected to a brutal regime of interrogation
and torture. Abuses within CIA prisons included drowning to the point of unconsciousness,
repeated beatings, the use of ice baths and hoses to induce hypothermia, sleep deprivation
for more than a week at a time, painful stress positions for months at a time, prolonged con-
ﬁnement in extremely small boxes, and sexual assault by forced feeding through the
rectum.5
The involvement of European security services in the United States (US)-led rendition,
secret detention and interrogation of terror suspects was particularly marked. European
intelligence agencies were involved in the initial detention of suspects on European soil,
in the provision of intelligence to the CIA that led to the capture of suspects, and in the
interrogation of suspects in detention.6 Questions have also been raised about the compli-
city of European states regarding the free movement of rendition aircraft across European
airspace.7 It was, however, the establishment of CIA black sites in Europe which most
clearly demonstrated the alignment of European governments with a number of abusive
and illegal practices in the War on Terror. At various points between December 2002
and March 2006, suspects were detained, in secret, in at least three countries: Poland,
Romania and Lithuania. These prisons were central to the RDI programme: the most
high-proﬁle of prisoners, including those most closely linked to the 9/11 attacks, spent
months or years detained in secret in one or more of these European states. Moreover,
some of the most egregious abuses emerging from the CIA’s programme took place in
these prisons, including waterboarding, mock executions and stress positions so severe
that, in one case, observers were concerned that the prisoner’s arms would dislocate
from his shoulders.8 Suspects detained in these prisons were subjected to an interrogation
regime designed, in the words of one interrogator, to take them ‘to the verge of death and
back again’.9
The ECtHR judgments with regards to Poland’s role in the programme were signiﬁcant
not only in terms of establishing the facts regarding the two particular cases before the court,
and not only in terms of establishing a precedent for holding states to legal account for their
abusive counterterrorism practices. The judgments also demonstrated the impact of the
work of a small group of investigators who have sought to expose the secret prison
network through the tracking of CIA rendition aircraft and the collation and analysis of
ﬂight data. The European black sites did not exist in isolation from one another, nor from
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prisons elsewhere in the world. Rather, they formed part of a global network of detention
facilities, connected to one another through hundreds of ‘rendition ﬂights’ by civilian air-
craft, operated by or on behalf of the CIA. These aircraft were used to transfer prisoners,
interrogators and other US ofﬁcials between prisons, in ﬂights undertaken without public
acknowledgement and entailing multiple violations of international law.10 Identifying the
aircraft involved in the RDI programme, and tracking their movements through the collec-
tion of ﬂight data, has been crucial to establishing the connections between prison sites, and
to mapping the evolution of the programme over time. Indeed, the US and its allies have
worked steadfastly to prevent details of the programme from emerging, with its component
elements designed with secrecy and plausible deniability speciﬁcally in mind. The rigorous
collection and analysis of data relating to the underlying logistical elements of the RDI pro-
gramme has, in turn, often played a key role in overcoming the layers of secrecy in which
rendition, secret detention and torture have been shrouded.
This article will examine how the tracking of rendition aircraft has been used to build a
clearer picture of CIA secret detention and torture in Europe. It will focus speciﬁcally on the
ﬁndings of a collaborative project the authors conducted between 2010 and 2013, working
as human rights investigators – for the legal action charity Reprieve (Black) and for Rep-
rieve and the human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO) Interights (Kostas) – and
as academics at the University of Kent (Blakeley) and Kingston University (Raphael)
working under the banner of The Rendition Project. Our collaboration has built on past
efforts by a range of investigators, but has also resulted in signiﬁcant new ﬁndings. By
gaining access to data collected by authorities for other purposes (in this case, air trafﬁc
management), and using our resulting database as a springboard for further investigative
work (including the sourcing and analysis of non-public business records), we were able
to establish a clearer picture of the operational elements of rendition. This includes the
identiﬁcation of a hitherto-undiscovered contracting network involving the CIA and a
range of private companies providing outsourced support for the RDI programme.
Further, through the triangulation of ﬁndings with other sources, such as prisoner testimony,
declassiﬁed government documents and media accounts of brieﬁngs by CIA ofﬁcials, the
team has made signiﬁcant advances in understanding how European black sites were con-
nected to one another, and to the wider global network of secret prisons, as well as provid-
ing conﬁrmatory evidence regarding who was detained in those sites and how they were
treated. In some cases, when matched with other forms of evidence our ﬂight data has
played a central role in the ongoing battle by legal teams to substantiate claims of the
locations and duration of speciﬁc cases of secret detention and torture, thus enabling
cases to be brought to courts such as the ECtHR.11 And importantly, as will be discussed
in this article, our work to date has allowed us to uncover the information that has been
obscured by many of the most signiﬁcant redactions in the SSCI report, thus enabling a
greater understanding of the programme than foreseen by those who took the report
through the declassiﬁcation process. This deconstruction, and subsequent reconstruction,
of the SSCI report is an ongoing research project of ours, launched in January 2015 in part-
nership with The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.12 And in this context, it is already
clear that our database is going to prove central to further advances in understanding the
role of Europe in the CIA’s programme.
In a wider sense, our work also provides an example of how a focus on logistical
elements of covert programmes can prove a fruitful avenue for research in the ﬁelds of
security and human rights. As such, we have contributed to the growing body of investiga-
tive work that uses rigorous analysis of public and non-public data sets – including data
secured under Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation – as a central component in
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efforts to uncover the workings of covert programmes, whether that be tracking illegal arms
shipments,13 mapping federal procurement for covert operations,14 or identifying the range
of US agencies and individuals working on ‘top secret’ programmes.15 Even more broadly,
our work demonstrates the mutual beneﬁts which can accrue from close collaboration
between academics and practitioners in the ﬁeld of human rights. Through establishing
data-sharing and project oversight mechanisms, and through a commitment on both sides
to ensure that academic rigour in project design and execution was accompanied by an
emphasis on sharing ﬁndings beyond the academy, our project has had some modest
success in its explicit objective of straddling the academic and practitioner worlds, and
of producing ﬁndings of relevance to both.
Understanding CIA secret detention in Europe
Despite the landmark ECtHR judgments in July 2014, and despite the unprecedented level
of detail revealed in the SSCI report, much remains unknown about the RDI programme.
High levels of operational secrecy, combined with persistent attempts by governments
involved in the programme to ensure that limited details are published, mean there continue
to be signiﬁcant impediments to developing a full understanding of what took place. The
prisoners themselves were transferred and detained in ways designed to disorientate, and
thus to protect the programme from discovery following their release. The use during ren-
dition operations of hooding and other forms of sensory deprivation (such as ear defenders),
along with drugging, placement in boxes and other containers, was typical.16 At times, ren-
dition operations involved circular or extended ﬂights as a form of deception.17 Once ren-
dered to a black site, prisoners continued to be denied knowledge of their whereabouts. It
has been reported that at least some of the prisons were constructed using identical blue-
prints, so prisoners moved between them would be unsure of where they were.18 Cells
were built far apart from one another, and the use of loud music and ‘white noise’ through-
out the facilities was designed to wear prisoners down, but also to prevent communication.
In at least one case, it appears that cells were built on springs so as to keep prisoners off-
balance and disorientated.19 Guards and interrogators were often masked, used false names
and communicated to each other and to prisoners in silence, using hand signals. Other forms
of deception, such as the manipulation of prayer schedules, and the provision of ‘local’ food
from other regions, have also been documented. As a result, many of those detained within
the CIA prison network remain unclear as to where they were, or who was responsible for
their mistreatment.
The US government under both the Bush and Obama administrations has also system-
atically attempted to minimise publication of details about the programme. ‘Many speciﬁcs
of this program’, Bush declared in September 2006, ‘including where these prisoners have
been held and the details of their conﬁnement, cannot be divulged’.20 And despite publicly
decrying the abuses of the Bush years, and outlawing many of the central elements of the
RDI programme, the Obama administration has maintained a similar position to its prede-
cessor, refusing to reveal details about the location of black sites and the identities of the
interrogators. Even members of the SSCI were refused this level of detail: the names of
the countries that hosted the black sites, the names of the countries with which the CIA
negotiated the hosting of sites, and the names of non-supervisory personnel were replaced
by pseudonyms for the committee (country names were replaced by letters, e.g., Country
A). In a further layer of secrecy, these pseudonyms (including all country letters) were
then redacted during the declassiﬁcation process in preparation for public release.21 As a
result, although the SSCI report reveals many new details about the operation of the
4 S. Raphael et al.
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programme, the role played by European states remains entirely hidden within ofﬁcial
accounts.
Despite these barriers to a full accounting of the RDI programme, a partial picture has
emerged of CIA secret detention in Europe. The ﬁrst details were published in November
2005, when Dana Priest at The Washington Post cited US and foreign ofﬁcials who claimed
that ‘the CIA has been hiding and interrogating some of its most important al Qaeda cap-
tives at a Soviet-era compound in Eastern Europe’, and that this was one of ‘several democ-
racies in Eastern Europe’ which formed a part of the covert prison system.22 Although The
Washington Post decided not to publish the names of the countries involved, Human Rights
Watch released a statement shortly afterwards declaring that there were secret prisons in
Poland and Romania.23 These allegations sparked outcry across the continent. Within
several weeks, two parallel intergovernmental investigations were established: one by the
European Parliament, led by rapporteur Giovanni Claudio Fava (hereafter, EP); and a
second by the Council of Europe, led by rapporteur Dick Marty through the Parliamentary
Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (hereafter, PACE). Together,
these investigations laid out the contours of European complicity. PACE concluded that
there existed a ‘global spider’s web’ of rendition and secret detention involving CIA
black sites, Department of Defense detention facilities, third country prisons, and rendition
ﬂights linking these sites.24 Regarding black sites in Europe, the ﬁnal report concluded con-
ﬁdently that ‘there is now enough evidence to state that secret detention facilities run by the
CIA did exist in Europe from 2003 to 2005, in particular in Poland and Romania’.25
Media accounts of unattributed brieﬁngs from former CIA ofﬁcials and ofﬁcials in the
host countries, site visits and other investigations have enabled some details of the black
sites in Europe to emerge. The Polish site consisted of two buildings within a military intel-
ligence training base, located in the woods outside the village of Stare Kiejkuty in the lakes
region of north-eastern Poland. Recent reports suggest that the CIA paid its Polish counter-
parts $15 million in cash for the use of the site, and at least $300,000 for improvements at
the site (including the installation of security cameras and the conversion of the two-storey
villa and adjacent shed).26 The location and layout of the Romanian site, code-named
‘Bright Light’, were revealed in December 2011 by journalists working for Associated
Press and the German ARD news programme Panorama. The team conﬁrmed that they
had spoken to ‘former US intelligence ofﬁcials familiar with the location and inner
working of the prison’ and that the site was located in the basement of a building in northern
Bucharest used by the National Registry Ofﬁce for Classiﬁed Information (ORNISS) to
store sensitive European Union (EU) and NATO ﬁles. The basement was, according to
one senior ORNISS ofﬁcial, ‘one of the most secure rooms in all of Romania’.27 In Lithua-
nia, meanwhile, an investigation by the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) Committee on
National Security and Defence (CNSD) conﬁrmed that the country had hosted two sites
on behalf of the CIA: Project No. 1, a single-storied detached building in the centre of
Vilnius; and Project No. 2, a larger facility housed at a former horse-riding school in the
village of Antaviliai, on the edge of woodland 15 miles from Vilnius.28 According to
ABC News, citing unnamed Lithuanian and US ofﬁcials, the CIA ‘built a thick concrete
wall inside the riding area. Behind the wall, it built what one Lithuanian source called “a
building within a building”. On a series of thick concrete pads, it installed what a source
called “prefabricated pods” to house prisoners, each separated from the other by ﬁve or
six feet. Each pod included a shower, a bed, and a toilet. Separate cells were constructed
for interrogations.’29
In each case, pre-existing buildings were adapted to provide bespoke detention facilities
suitable for housing a relatively small number of prisoners. According to press reports, the
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logistical elements of construction were largely overseen by Kyle D. Foggo, then head of
the CIA’s main European supply base in Frankfurt, with CIA engineers and contract
workers involved.30 There is also evidence that local security forces and private contractors
were involved in the construction of the black sites in Europe.31
These sites in Poland, Romania and Lithuania were important nodes in a worldwide
network of prison locations. We shall argue in this article that the study of transfers
between these locations has proved essential for understanding both the evolution of this
network and the fate and whereabouts of those detained and tortured within it.
Foundational efforts to track rendition aircraft
The use of rendition aircraft, operated by or on behalf of the CIA, was central to the RDI
programme. In turn, the suspicious movements of certain aircraft across the globe provided
one of the ﬁrst indications of a covert detention programme in the War on Terror, supple-
menting the early testimony during 2004–2005 from some of those who had been CIA pris-
oners and had either been released or were in US military custody at Guantánamo Bay.32 As
the importance of these aircraft became clearer, investigators began to track their move-
ments, thus building the ﬁrst data sets regarding renditions.33 As a result, by the time
that PACE and EP investigations had begun their work at the end of 2005, they were
able to compile lists of aircraft identiﬁed by a range of investigative journalists and
NGOs as ‘suspected either of belonging to the CIA or of being operated on the CIA’s
behalf by “front companies”’.34
It was these lists of aircraft which formed the springboard for both investigations. With
suspicious aircraft in mind, the EP and PACE teams were able to request ﬂight data from
Eurocontrol, the pan-European agency responsible for coordinating the management of
European airspace. In the case of PACE, this request was for the movement of 55 regis-
tration numbers, which are used as unique identiﬁers for aircraft within air trafﬁc manage-
ment systems.35 Flight records on 36 of these aircraft were received by PACE in early 2006,
documenting 2545 individual ﬂights in European airspace, along with a set of aeronautical
data strings pertaining to particular ﬂights of interest.36 In this context, data strings are
understood to be ‘exchanges of messages or digital data between different entities (includ-
ing aviation service providers, Air Navigation Services authorities, airport authorities and
government agencies) around the world on the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication
Network (AFTN) or the Socíeté Internationale Télécommunique Aéronautique (SITA)
Network’.37 Such messages include ﬂight plans sent by aircraft operators (or their con-
tracted ‘trip planners’) to relevant air trafﬁc authorities, communicating the intended desti-
nation, route and timings of a ﬂight, as well as any special status. The EP investigation also
had access to Eurocontrol data, as well as ﬂight data from the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) in the US. This team had its own list of 36 tail numbers, and logged 1939
separate aircraft movements across European airspace (including 1245 stopovers in
Europe) between December 2001 and February 2006.38 Together, this data pointed
towards locations in Europe likely to have been used as sites for CIA secret detention or
as connecting points in the network (e.g. refuelling stops). In particular, the data allowed
investigators to identify Poland and Romania as potential black site locations, given the fre-
quency and characteristics of landings in these countries by suspicious aircraft.39
Freedom of Information requests by the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) and the
Warsaw-based Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR), conducted in 2009 and
2010, led to the release of further ﬂight data connecting rendition aircraft to the Polish
black site. Speciﬁcally, portions of data strings, landing records and other ﬂight data held
6 S. Raphael et al.
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by the national air trafﬁc authorities – the Polish Air Navigation Services Authority
(PANSA) and the Border Guard Ofﬁce – were obtained, providing public conﬁrmation
that rendition aircraft had landed in Poland throughout 2003.40
These investigations led to the identiﬁcation and tracking of several key aircraft, most of
which were owned by the CIA via a shifting array of shell companies such as Stevens
Express, Premier Executive Transport, Rapid Air Transport, Path Corporation or Aviation
Specialties.41 These companies were the registered owners of the aircraft, but only existed
on paper as a front for the CIA. They were regularly dissolved, with the aircraft ‘sold’ to
other shell companies and often reregistered with new tail numbers along the way to
cover tracks. Meanwhile, the aircraft themselves were operated by a set of real companies,
responsible for maintenance, providing hangers and arranging the logistical details for each
ﬂight circuit. Many of these operating companies, such as Aero Contractors, Pegasus Tech-
nologies and Tepper Aviation, have been reported as having very close links to, or even
working exclusively for, the CIA.42 Other companies appearing in the data strings, such
as Jeppesen International Trip Planning/Jeppesen Dataplan and Universal Weather and
Aviation, were companies providing so-called trip planning services to a range of corporate
and government clients. These companies were responsible for ensuring that the required
ﬂight plans were ﬁled, overﬂight and landing authorisations received and hotel reservations
booked.
Investigations also uncovered the use of false ﬂight planning to disguise rendition oper-
ations. These provided air trafﬁc authorities with incorrect destination airports, ensuring
that the paper trail did not highlight their true landing locations. As a result, signiﬁcant sec-
tions of the Eurocontrol data made available to PACE are fragmentary and contradictory:
aircraft are documented as taking off from an airport but not as arriving at it previously;
multiple ﬂight plans are ﬁled on the same day to a range of destinations; aircraft appear
to jump between airports with no log of an intermediate ﬂight. In addition, ﬂight plans
for important operations were often tagged with one of a range of ‘special status’ designa-
tions denoting a diplomatic or state function for the ﬂight. These designations allowed air-
craft to bypass the normal rules of air trafﬁc management, and in this way minimise
reporting to authorities and expedite aircraft movements.43
Recent advances in tracking rendition aircraft: Reprieve, The Rendition Project
and the ‘prime contract’
Work by investigators up until 2010 brought many aspects of the RDI programme to light.
However, while several key rendition aircraft had been identiﬁed and extensively tracked, it
is now clear that many others remained unknown to investigators. This profoundly affected
the scope of the resulting data sets, given that the primary data collection method of all
investigations relied upon a predetermined list of suspicious aircraft thought to have
been involved in the RDI programme. Little was also known about the connections
between individual aircraft, and how each was integrated into the overarching RDI pro-
gramme.44 This was particularly true with regard to the aircraft leased by the CIA, and a
lack of understanding regarding operational details – such as contracting networks, support-
ing companies, and the global system of landing permits at US bases – meant that connec-
tions between apparently unrelated ﬂights were missed and the identiﬁcation of further
suspicious aircraft was hampered. It was also the case that prior investigations, through a
heavy reliance on data supplied by European air trafﬁc authorities, resulted in ﬂight data
sets with a signiﬁcant bias towards ﬂights into, within, and out of European airspace.
The Eurocentricity of the data, coming not least as a result of the relative transparency of
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public authorities in Europe as compared to Africa, the Middle East and Asia, meant that it
was often possible to track aircraft in some detail as they ﬂew from the US to Europe,
passed through Europe (stopping over on the way through for refuelling), and onwards
to a next destination (typically in North Africa or the Middle East). In contrast, it was poss-
ible to say much less about where aircraft went to after that next destination, and what
would sometimes have been multi-stop circuits throughout Africa and Asia often remained
wholly absent from the collected data.
With these gaps in mind, a major advance in the ﬁeld after 2010 has been the identiﬁ-
cation by Reprieve of a contracting network which united several known aircraft and many
other previously unknown ones in a coherent pattern of behaviour. Operating alongside –
and, to an extent, during a later period than – those aircraft owned by CIA shell companies,
the commercial on-demand charter aircraft operators involved in this network provided a
second set of aircraft for rendition operations, along with pilots, crew and all other logistical
requirements (so-called ‘wet leasing’). In May 2011, Kostas and Black uncovered the exist-
ence of a US district court case between two companies involved in RDI outsourcing: oper-
ating company Richmor Aviation and broker SportsFlight. They obtained court records
including a signiﬁcant bundle of paperwork which had been disclosed by the parties as evi-
dence. This led to the identiﬁcation of key sources and, subsequently, to the receipt of thou-
sands of pages of further material. The material was data-mined and ordered with the
assistance of volunteers at Reprieve. Overall, this revealed the existence of a contracting
network established by the US government to ﬂy prisoners, interrogators and other ofﬁcials
between black sites, and to Guantánamo Bay. Documents include quotes, invoices, billing
reconciliations, subcontracts and subcontract task order modiﬁcations, all of which laid out
the intricacies of the programme to an extent never before revealed.
The contractual and invoicing documents uncovered in this way have been used to build
an unprecedented picture of a coherent branch of the RDI programme. No documentation
had so far emerged showing with such clarity how the US government and its contractors
had worked together to service CIA black sites and facilitate prisoner movements between
them.45 The court documents identiﬁed two successive prime contractors, DynCorp
Systems and Solutions, LLC (hereafter, DynCorp) and Computer Sciences Corporation
(CSC), which were operating under a ‘prime contract’ with the CIA.46 These companies
undertook to organise ﬂight operations on behalf of the US government. They subcon-
tracted to two brokering companies – Capital Aviation and SportsFlight – which in turn
contracted with more than a dozen aircraft operating companies to secure the services of
particular aircraft and the logistics required to mount global, multiday trips.47 Analysis
of documents relating to these business relationships has led to the identiﬁcation of over
60 aircraft operating under contract for the CIA rendition programme, only 10 of which
had been previously investigated by the PACE and EP inquiries. Crucially, and innova-
tively, individual trips by these aircraft could be traced back, using invoicing and contrac-
tual reference numbers, to the network and thereby to the government.
Throughout the second half of 2011, Reprieve worked with the transparency organis-
ation Access Info Europe to conduct further investigations into the movements of these
newly discovered aircraft. These organisations undertook a concerted programme of FOI
requests in 27 countries in order to secure the release of relevant ﬂight data. The results
of this project pointed to signiﬁcant variations in effectiveness and implementation of Euro-
pean right to information laws, although signiﬁcant new data did emerge from Lithuania,
Poland and the US.48 The project also pointed to a signiﬁcant limitation in the scope of
transparency laws: in particular, the most important single data source – Eurocontrol –
remains outside any access to information regime and only provides data ad hoc to
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certain national and supranational bodies. Major Eurocontrol data disclosures were ulti-
mately obtained via collaboration with the Rapporteur for the European Parliament’s Com-
mittee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in 2012.49
Collaboration between Reprieve and The Rendition Project, beginning in late 2011,
facilitated the collation of this new data alongside other data sets compiled by a range of
investigators. The resulting Rendition Flight Database (hereafter, ‘the database’) contains
both the original PACE and published EP data alongside that secured in more recent inves-
tigations. The database, which comprises over 11,000 ﬂights by more than 200 aircraft, has
enabled further details to emerge regarding hundreds of circuits by aircraft linked to the RDI
programme.50 Speciﬁcally, the database contains the most comprehensive public account to
date of over 60 identiﬁed rendition operations, where particular circuits have been matched
to known prisoner transfers. The database also includes over 200 further circuits which
involve a landing in at least one secret prison destination. Many of these include direct
ﬂights between two or more known secret prison destinations, pointing to further rendition
operations; others may have carried interrogators or other ofﬁcials to, from or between
secret prisons. Importantly, for many of these circuits, each individual data set comprising
the database contains only partial records of an aircraft’s movement. It has only been
through the collation of multiple data sets, and a corresponding match with contracting
paperwork to tie speciﬁc circuits to the RDI programme, that relevant and meaningful cir-
cuits have been reconstructed. This has undoubtedly led to a more complete accounting of
the movements of rendition aircraft: while some of the circuits in the database had been
identiﬁed by previous investigations, many have been new discoveries as a result of our
work.51
With the publication of the database in May 2013, The Rendition Project and Reprieve
have provided the largest publically available record of rendition ﬂights to date. It is worth
noting that our database is still limited by the Eurocentricity of many of our sources, and the
relative difﬁculties in accessing ﬂight data from some regions means that several major
lacunae still exist. This is an important qualiﬁer, as the absence in our database of many
ﬂights into countries such as Pakistan, Syria, Djibouti and Iraq reﬂects only the barriers
to data collection, and should not lead to the conclusion that such ﬂights did not take
place. Having said this, our contracting documentation in particular has no geographical
bias, and does allow for a larger window into the global operations of rendition aircraft
in the War on Terror. Analysis of the database has, in turn, led to a much clearer picture
of operations in European black sites and their connections to each other and to other
sites in the prison network. It is to these key ﬁndings that we now turn.
Connecting European black sites
Establishing a clearer understanding of which aircraft were involved in the RDI pro-
gramme, and a more comprehensive set of data regarding the movements of these aircraft
between 2001 and 2006, has been an important investigative step: it has enabled a more
complete picture to emerge of how secret prisons in Europe were connected to other
prisons in the system during this time, and when prisoner transfer operations into and
out of Europe may have taken place. The database now contains 23 circuits by 15 separate
rendition aircraft which link the European black sites to each other, and to the wider
network. For full details of each of these circuits, see Appendix A.
It is worth noting that the database documents many more ﬂights into or out of Poland
(60), Romania (303) and Lithuania (21). The 23 highlighted circuits are a subset of these
ﬂights: they were undertaken by aircraft ﬁrmly established by past investigations, and by
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our analysis of the contracting paperwork, as operating within the RDI programme; there is
data which conﬁrms, in these speciﬁc cases, direct ﬂights between European black sites and
other secret prison destinations; and the documented circuits took place during the period
that the sites are thought to have been operational. It remains possible (indeed, likely) that
there are other relevant circuits in the database, but that gaps in the data or our knowledge of
the aircraft involved lead us at this stage to discount them from our ﬁndings. Further, it is
almost certain that other rendition aircraft remain unidentiﬁed, and some of these may have
been used to connect the European black sites.
Although some of the circuits were identiﬁed by earlier investigations – especially
ﬂights connecting Poland during 2003 – our analysis of the contracting documents, FOI
releases and new Eurocontrol data has led directly to numerous discoveries. In fact, of
the 23 circuits in the database connecting European black sites, 11 are new discoveries,
comprising 14 separate ﬂights: four of the nine ﬂights into Romania; six of the seven
ﬂights out of Romania; and all four circuits connecting Lithuania to the wider secret
prison network. In the case of four further circuits, some details were known prior to our
work, but our ﬁndings have revealed important additional facts. For each of these 15
cases, our contracting data deﬁnitively ties the circuits to the same corporate network as
numerous other rendition circuits, and the itineraries in each case clearly link secret
prison locations.
This more complete picture of CIA rendition ﬂights into and out of European black sites
helps to develop broader understandings of the evolution of the RDI programme, and the
signiﬁcance of each site within it. CIA prisons in Europe did not exist in isolation from
one another, nor in isolation from the broader, global network of prisons. Key rendition cir-
cuits indicate that prisoners were often moved between sites in Europe, or into, out of, and
then back into Europe on ﬂights connecting these sites to other secret prisons in Afghani-
stan, the Middle East, North Africa and Guantánamo Bay. Flight data conﬁrm and clarify
other sources which suggest that the global network of black sites was not static: individual
prisons were not all operational at the same time, but appear to have been used in rotation,
with prisoners often moved between them in groups. In this context, ﬂight data can be used
to identify key moments where particular secret prisons were closed and their prisoners
moved to another site.
The database conﬁrms that the Polish black site was ﬁrst connected to the wider network
of secret prisons in December 2002, with a rendition ﬂight landing at Szymany from the
CIA’s ﬁrst ofﬁcial detention site, in Bangkok, Thailand.52 Eurocontrol data analysed by
the PACE investigation had already identiﬁed a landing at Szymany in December 2002
by the aircraft with registration number N63MU as suspicious, given that it had ﬁled a
false ﬂight plan from Dubai to Vienna to mask the landing at the Polish airport.53 It was
not until 2010, however, that the full itinerary of the aircraft was revealed, including the
landing in Bangkok (and thus the connection between the two black sites).54 The
DynCorp/CSC documents gathered and analysed by our team – including invoices,
billing information and contracts for the circuit – conﬁrm the details of the route ﬂown,
as well as the fact that N63MU undertook this mission for DynCorp, on behalf of the
US government, and that contractual arrangements for this mission were related to those
for other identiﬁed rendition missions.55
Further ﬂights into and out of Poland during 2003, all sharing the characteristics of ren-
dition operations, connect Stare Kiejkuty with detention locations in Morocco and Afgha-
nistan, as prisoners were rendered between them (see Appendix A for full details). Several
sources suggest that the Polish site was then closed in September 2003, with remaining pris-
oners moved to other secret prisons in the network. According to some CIA sources,
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speaking off the record, this reshufﬂing (as well as others) was carried out to avoid the
exposure that was likely if one location was maintained for too long.56 The database con-
ﬁrms a key circuit matching these claims: between 20 and 25 September 2003, the aircraft
N313P ﬂew from Kabul to Szymany, then on to Bucharest, Rabat and Guantánamo Bay, in
what some in the CIA have labelled, scathingly, a ‘ﬁve-card straight revealing the program
to outsiders: ﬁve stops, ﬁve secret facilities, all documented’.57 Other characteristics,
including the ﬁling of false ﬂight plans and the use of STS designators, offered further indi-
cators that this was a prisoner transfer circuit.58
The closure of the site at Stare Kiejkuty appears to have been timed alongside the
opening of the black site in Romania, situated in Bucharest.59 The September 2003
circuit linking Kabul and Szymany to Bucharest is the ﬁrst indication in the database of
Romania being linked to other prison locations by a plane known to have been involved
in the RDI programme. After this date, however, we are now able to identify eight other
circuits which appear to involve prisoner transfers into Romania throughout 2004 and
2005 from other secret prisons in the network, including the black site at Guantánamo
Bay, Afghanistan, Jordan, Morocco and Egypt. The database also contains other circuits
during this time which appear to be prisoner transfer ﬂights out of Romania and to these
other sites (see Appendix A for full details).
As it became clear to the CIA that the existence of its detention site in Romania was
about to be exposed, it appears that the prison was swiftly closed. The database identiﬁes
four possible prisoner transfers out of Romania throughout 2005, to secret prison locations
in Lithuania, Egypt, Jordan and Afghanistan.60 Prisoners held in Romania during that time
were likely to have been moved on board one of these ﬂights, the last of which corresponds
with the ﬁrst public revelations of the CIA prison in the country.
Our ﬁndings have also been able to offer, for the ﬁrst time, an account of prisoner move-
ments through Lithuania. Initial research by ABC News suggested that prisoners were trans-
ferred there from Afghanistan in September 2004 and July 2005.61 However, no
independent data has yet been able to conﬁrm these, and the planes in question were not
recorded by the CNSD inquiry.62 In contrast, there is now documentary evidence of
three ﬂights by newly identiﬁed rendition aircraft into Lithuania during 2005, which
were recorded by the CNSD inquiry, although their full circuits (essential for understanding
their purpose) were not ascertained at that time. Two of these circuits took place concur-
rently, in February 2005, and linked several black site locations in what appears to be a
reshufﬂing of prisoners. The third, in October 2005, came from Romania as that site was
being closed. And although some early reports suggested that the Lithuanian prison was
closed in late 2005,63 ﬂight data indicate that prisoners were held at the site until March
2006. At this point, prisoners were likely to have been moved to Egypt or Afghanistan,
on board the one rendition circuit out of the country identiﬁed thus far.
As well as establishing the existence of new ﬂights connecting secret prison locations,
our ﬂight data contain numerous additional details indicating the continued effort on behalf
of the authorities to conceal the operation of black sites and the ﬂights connecting them. The
ﬁling of false ﬂight plans, a technique uncovered by the PACE investigation, can also be
observed in circuits undertaken by aircraft newly identiﬁed as connected to the RDI pro-
gramme. The 18 February 2005 ﬂight by N787WH from Romania to Lithuania, for
example, was disguised by the ﬁling of a ﬂight plan from Bucharest to Gothenburg,
Sweden. The true destination of the ﬂight – Palanga, Lithuania – was identiﬁed by the
CNSD investigation, and is conﬁrmed by an invoice from Palanga airport authorities and
by contracting paperwork.64 Flight recording and customs inspection protocols were also
modiﬁed in several of these cases, in order to ensure that knowledge of, and interference
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with, the landings at black site destinations were kept to a minimum. The CNSD investi-
gation found that on at least three occasions where aircraft landed in Lithuania – each of
which we now know had come from other black sites, and were likely to be carrying prison-
ers – the SSD took over handling duties from the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) to
ensure ‘the provision of assistance to an intelligence service in getting unrestricted
access to aircraft and access to/departure from the territory of the airport’. The SBGS tes-
tiﬁed to the CNSD that its ofﬁcers were prevented from inspecting these aircraft, and that no
customs inspections were carried out.65
Our ﬂight data analysis has also identiﬁed a signiﬁcant diversionary tactic employed by
the CIA and its contractors: the use of two aircraft to link two prison sites, meeting for a
cargo-switch on the runway of a third country. Thus, one aircraft would ﬂy from black
site destination A to a third-country runway, where it would meet a second aircraft
which had not visited anywhere suspicious. Both aircraft would be on the ground together
for less than an hour – likely while prisoners were transferred between the aircraft – before
the ﬁrst aircraft left for home and the second aircraft ﬂew its cargo to black site destination
B. As a result, ﬂight records document no one ﬂight linking the black sites, making it far
more difﬁcult to identify potential rendition operations. Four such ‘combined circuits’
have been identiﬁed as a result of our analysis, connecting prison sites in Romania, Lithua-
nia and Afghanistan between May 2005 and March 2006 (see Appendix A for full details).
Analysis of ﬂight data and associated documentation relevant to these combined circuits
establishes that, in some cases, multiple tactics were used simultaneously to disguise the
true route of the aircraft. The March 2006 combined circuit between Lithuania and Afgha-
nistan is representative of this.66 A Boeing 737 aircraft with registration N733MA, operated
by Victory Air Transport pursuant to the prime contract, had ﬁled a plan for a ﬂight from
Portugal to Finland on 25 March 2006, but had actually ﬂown to Lithuania. As the
CNSD investigation found, the aircraft landed in Lithuania that evening and left 90
minutes later. However, rather than returning to Portugal, as recorded by Lithuanian auth-
orities, other records retrieved from both Eurocontrol and the Polish authorities demonstrate
it in fact ﬂew to Egypt, where it was on the runway in the early hours of 26 March. Other
data show that another Boeing 737 aircraft, with registration N740EH and operated by
Miami Air International also pursuant to the prime contract, was at Cairo airport on the
same night, and the two were on the ground at the same time for about 30 minutes.
N740EH then took off, presumably with prisoners now on board, and ﬂew direct to Afgha-
nistan. As well as disguising the true routes through ﬁling false information, the accompa-
nying contracting paperwork also attempts to keep the exact landing details secret, by
replacing the correct airport codes with the anonymised codes TTT, WWW, XXX and ZZZ.
Overall, our work since 2010 – building on the important advances made before this
date – has enabled a clearer understanding of how each of the European black sites were
connected to one another, and to others in the global network. As a result of recent analysis
of newly acquired ﬂight data and associated documentation, it has been possible to identify
a clear set of aircraft operating as part of a coherent contracting network run by the CIA for
the purposes of the RDI programme; new ﬂight circuits by these aircraft linking secret
prison destinations in Europe with each other, and with sites elsewhere in the network;
and a new set of diversionary tactics employed by the CIA in order to disguise the contours
of the RDI programme. Flight data analysis, however, leads to more than just a clearer
picture of the pattern and practice of rendition ﬂights in the War on Terror. When triangu-
lated with other forms of evidence, it can also be used to help map (geographically) the
human rights abuses which resulted from the RDI programme, and thus identify the juris-
dictions within which rendition, secret detention and torture took place. In turn, this has led
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to a signiﬁcant impact for advocacy efforts and for the attempts of prisoners formerly held at
black sites to seek justice for the abuses they suffered. It is to the wider signiﬁcance of our
project that we now turn.
Mapping rendition, secret detention and torture: the signiﬁcance of tracking
rendition aircraft
Tracking rendition aircraft can play a crucial role in seeking accountability for the multiple
and systematic human rights abuses which resulted from the RDI programme. Rendition
operations leave traces in the data which, especially in combination, may indicate compli-
city in enforced disappearance, secret detention and torture. Such traces can include
repeated landings at particular airports; landings at locations which cannot be explained,
geographically, as simple refuelling points midway through longer journeys; landings
immediately before or after landings at known secret prison locations; landings at the
same time and place as known rendition aircraft; landings as part of a documented contract
which also encompasses proven rendition operations; and landings accompanied by the use
of diversionary tactics used elsewhere for documented rendition operations. This type of
analysis can suggest locations for secret prisons, as well as subsidiary (but nevertheless
vital) nodes in the RDI programme, such as refuelling points and rest and relaxation
locations for rendition teams.67 In some cases, such analysis has provided the ﬁrst indi-
cations of secret prison locations, which have then been conﬁrmed through further inves-
tigation.68 Elsewhere, ﬂight data analysis has provided important corroborating evidence
of secret detention facilities at a particular location.69
Establishing the locations of secret prisons in the network is an important investigative
step, and underpins many efforts to ensure accountability. The analysis of ﬂight data is at its
most compelling, however, when triangulated with a range of other sources which identify
those held within the programme, and the treatment to which they were subjected. Impor-
tant sources in this regard include numerous ﬁrst-hand accounts by those held within the
programme and subsequently released,70 as well as the testimonies taken by the ICRC
from 14 ‘high-value detainees’ in Guantánamo Bay, all of whom had been through the
CIA’s detention programme.71 Such testimonies often give detailed chronological accounts
of detentions and mistreatment. However, in themselves they are insufﬁcient to constitute
strong evidence as to where the detention and treatment occurred, since prisoners were
often unaware of where they were, or could only make deductions from ambiguous
phenomena such as weather conditions, guards’ language, food, and external noise. Two
other types of evidence supplement these accounts. Declassiﬁed US government docu-
ments, such as the SSCI report, the 2004 report by the CIA’s Inspector General into treat-
ment carried out in the early stages of the programme up to October 2003 (hereafter the ‘IG
report’), and a set of ofﬁcial memoranda describing the detention and treatment regimes
within the programme, together provide a detailed (although by no means complete)
account of who was held in the black sites and how they were treated.72 However, key
details (such as locations) are redacted throughout these documents. For example, in the
SSCI report each black site is referred to by a pseudonym, such as BLUE, GREEN,
COBALT (which bears no relation to the operational names given by the CIA), while all
information which could identify the countries in which they were located has been
redacted. In addition to these ofﬁcial documents, selected journalists have been granted
unattributed comments by particular CIA ofﬁcials concerning the exact whereabouts of par-
ticular individuals.73 Such brieﬁngs have often provided important indicators, but of course
are uncorroborated. Moreover, the SSCI report found that the CIA in many cases provided
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information to selected journalists as part of a coordinated attempt to ‘shape’ press reporting
of the programme, often through the leaking of inaccurate information.74
The veracity of all these sources can be tested, and in some cases strengthened, by cross-
referencing them with ﬂight data. Flight data analysis of the sort described in this article
provides falsiﬁable evidence which can corroborate inferences from government redac-
tions, testimony of prisoners and unattributed statements of ofﬁcials. In this way it has
been possible to name several prisoners held together in Poland in 2002–2003, and tie
accounts of their individual abuse to their time in that country. Thus, it can be established
with a very high degree of certainty that the ﬁrst rendition ﬂight into Poland, from Bangkok
to Szymany in December 2002, had Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri on board.
The SSCI report states that ‘in December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was
closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE’.75 A
careful reading of two further US government documents, each of which has been partially
declassiﬁed (but with differing information left un-redacted in each case) reveals the exact
day of the transfer (4 December 2002) and the fact that the two men were transferred
together from one location to another.76 Flight data documents only one possible transfer
by a rendition aircraft between known sites on that day, namely the trip by N63MU from
Thailand to Poland.
Matching ﬂight data with the SSCI report in other cases conﬁrms that DETENTION
SITE BLUE was in fact the Polish site. For example, the SSCI report states that ‘ofﬁcers
at CIA Headquarters decided that the CIA should obtain [redacted] custody of [Ramzi]
bin al-Shibh [from the custody of a foreign government] and render him to DETENTION
SITE BLUE in Country [redacted]’. The report then provides indications of when this ren-
dition took place: ‘on February [redacted], 2003, in anticipation of bin al-Shibh’s arrival,
interrogators… prepared an interrogation plan’.77 Unattributed comments by CIA ofﬁcials
have suggested that the foreign government concerned was Morocco, a fact which is sup-
ported by ﬂight data matching the SSCI report’s earlier assertion that he was captured in
Pakistan on 11 September 2002 and rendered to a foreign government ‘on September
[redacted], 2002’.78 By 12 February 2003, ‘CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE
BLUE assessed that bin al-Shibh was cooperative.’79 Bin al-Shibh’s rendition from the
custody of a foreign government (Morocco) to DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore took
place at some point between 1 and 12 February 2003. Flight data provide independent con-
ﬁrmation of this rendition, and reveal the location of DETENTION SITE BLUE: the Gulf-
stream V with registration N379P ﬂew from Morocco to Poland on 6 February 2003 (see
Appendix A). In a similar fashion, the SSCI report’s ﬁndings that Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed was rendered from DETENTION SITE COBALT to DETENTION SITE
BLUE on ‘March [redacted], 2003’, and that he was subjected to an initial round of
‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ at BLUE ‘between March [redacted], 2003, and
March 9, 2003’,80 can be matched with a ﬂight on 7 March by rendition aircraft N379P
(see Appendix A). In Mohammed’s case, his own account to the ICRC gave other indicators
which led him, independently, to consider that Poland was the place of detention. Others,
such as Walid bin Attash, gave accounts to the ICRC which also closely match ﬂights into
Poland by aircraft known to have participated in rendition operations, and which disguised
its landings at Szymany according to the methodology discussed above.81
Our recent work also supports accounts of prisoner movements during the later phase of
the programme, 2004–2006, helping to build a picture of who was detained in Romania and
Lithuania. Matching ﬂight data with other sources alongside a close reading of the SSCI
report allows us to determine that DETENTION SITE BLACK was the Romanian site
and DETENTION SITE VIOLET was the Lithuanian site.82 The database documents
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ﬂights into Romania from Guantánamo Bay in March and April 2004, and fromMorocco in
October 2004 and February 2005, each of which corroborates sources providing details of
the movements of individual prisoners within the programme, and each of which has
characteristics common to rendition ﬂights.83 In addition, the database documents ﬂights
which closely match the accounts of newly captured prisoners being transferred to
Romania, where sources place Janat Gul and Abu Faraj al-Libi after their initial detention
in Pakistan and then Afghanistan in July 2004 and May 2005 respectively.84 Flight data
from February 2005 has also corroborated the report of Abu Zubaydah’s rendition from
Morocco to Lithuania.85
Establishing where named individuals were held at particular times, and successfully
unpicking the pseudonyms given to the black sites in the SSCI report, is crucial, as it geo-
graphically locates the CIA torture of named individuals within speciﬁc jurisdictions. For
example, the SSCI report provides signiﬁcant details of the torture conducted at DETEN-
TION SITE BLUE. Shortly after al-Nashiri’s arrival in Poland, interrogators concluded in a
cable to headquarters that he was ‘being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and
prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance that he will… suffer the sort of per-
manent mental harm prohibited by statute’. Regardless, headquarters sent an untrained
interrogator to Poland to assess al-Nashiri, who led in the use of authorised and
unauthorised ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, such as mock execution, threats of
torture with a power drill, threats of familial rape, and ‘bathing’ with a stiff brush in a tech-
nique designed speciﬁcally to cause pain.86 According to the IG report, al-Nashiri was also
subjected to ‘potentially injurious stress positions’:
Al-Nashiri was required to kneel on the ﬂoor and lean back. On at least one occasion, an
Agency ofﬁcer reportedly pushed al-Nashiri backward while he was in this stress position.
On another occasion, [redacted] said he had to intercede after [redacted] expressed concern
that al-Nashiri’s arms might be dislocated from his shoulders. [Redacted] explained that, at
the time, the interrogators were attempting to put al-Nashiri in a standing stress position. Al-
Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the ﬂoor by his arms while his arms were bound behind his
back with a belt.87
Prisoners’ own accounts of treatment in what we now know was Poland conﬁrm the use of
the full range of authorised ‘standard’ and ‘enhanced’ interrogation techniques at the site, as
well as unauthorised techniques.88 Prisoners speak of being shackled naked and in a stand-
ing position, with wrists tied to the ceiling, for days or weeks at a time; being doused each
day with cold water from a hosepipe; being refused solid food or sanitation; and being sub-
jected to continuous artiﬁcial light and either music or ‘white noise’; and, in some cases,
being waterboarded.89 Walid bin Attash was made to wear a diaper for ten days at a
time, far in excess of the time allowed. ‘On some occasions’, he reported, ‘the diaper
was not replaced and so I had to urinate and defecate over myself’. During interrogations,
he also ‘heard sounds of a person being tortured next door’.90 According to the IG report,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was waterboarded ‘in a manner inconsistent with’ Department
of Justice (DoJ) authorisations, in that he was subjected to it over 180 times during March
2003.91 According to Mohammed, during this time his interrogators claimed they had had
authorisation from Washington to give him a hard time, but that he would not be killed: ‘I
was told that they would not allow me to die, but that I would be brought to the “verge of
death and back again”’.92
Torture was used by the CIA at its Romania site. Hassan Ghul, for example, was sub-
jected to 59 hours’ sleep deprivation after his arrival at DETENTION SITE BLACK, after
which point he began to hallucinate. He was also hung from a ceiling for extended periods,
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inducing mild paralysis and abdominal and back muscle pain.93 Likewise, Janat Gul was
subjected to ‘continuous sleep deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps,
stress positions, and walling, until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations’.
According to cables from the site, Gul was ‘not orientated to time or place’, saw ‘his
wife and children in the mirror and… heard their voices in the white noise’ and, ultimately,
‘asked to die, or just be killed’.94
Rather less is currently known about prisoner mistreatment in Lithuania. It is clear,
however, that those detained in the programme during 2005–2006 were, at the very
least, subjected to a range of conditioning techniques, including hooding, blindfolding,
shackling, and constant illumination and noise.95 It is also clear that the impact of this
form of prolonged, isolated, secret detention on those detained was considerable. According
to the DoJ, it had ‘no illusions about the cumulative strain that these conditions may impose
on prisoners… These conditions are unrelenting and, in some cases, have been in place for
several years. [These] conditions, taken together and extended over an indeﬁnite period,
may exact a signiﬁcant psychological toll.’96
Conclusion
In this article we have shown that the tracking of rendition aircraft has enabled us to signiﬁ-
cantly advance understanding of how the European black sites were integrated into the
CIA’s global RDI programme. Our analysis conﬁrms how signiﬁcant the support provided
by a number of European states was for the CIA’s global counter-terror operations. Speciﬁ-
cally we have been able to identify new ﬂight circuits by rendition aircraft which linked a
number of secret prisons in Europe to each other and to a range of other sites elsewhere in
the world that were also central to the RDI programme.
We have also been able to shed new light on the range of tactics used by the CIA to
disguise a number of rendition operations, and thereby conceal elements of the RDI pro-
gramme. This raises important questions about the capacity of the current architecture of
global human rights governance to hold states to account for their complicity in rights vio-
lations, particularly when those states go to such considerable lengths to evade exposure
and shield perpetrators from prosecution.
Nevertheless, an investigative focus on logistical elements of covert programmes has
the potential to provide a window into at least some of the workings of such operations.
In our work, this has been achieved through the triangulation of ﬂight data with a range
of other public sources. Building upon the work conducted by earlier investigators, we
have been able to suggest locations for secret prisons, refuelling points for many rendition
operations, and ‘rest and relaxation’ locations for rendition teams. We have been able to
conﬁrm the renditions of speciﬁc individuals and, importantly, we have been able to
locate the mistreatment suffered by individuals to speciﬁc jurisdictions, and thus provide
evidentiary support for those seeking redress through the justice system. In short, we
have been able to advance understanding of the RDI programme by mapping many of
the human rights violations which took place.
Mapping abuse in this way has important consequences for legal remedy. Indeed, the
ECtHR has cited ﬂight data, and accepted arguments drawn from ﬂight data, in judgments
on rendition and secret detention in three cases at the time of writing. In the case of el-Masri
v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the court found that ﬂight data ‘enhanced
the applicant’s credibility’ regarding allegations of secret detention in Macedonia and sub-
sequent rendition from there to Afghanistan, and formed ‘prima facie evidence in favour of
the applicant’s version of events’.97 In the cases of Abu Zubaydah v. Poland and al-Nashiri
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v. Poland, the secrecy regime in Guantánamo Bay meant that the applicants were unable to
provide a ﬁrst-hand account of their detention. The court nonetheless found that evidence
drawn from aviation data was ‘sufﬁciently convincing’ to place the applicants in Poland,
and accepted that there was ‘no alternative explanation’ for the ﬂight that had taken
them there.98 Further cases before the court and before domestic investigative bodies,
ongoing at the time of writing, seek to use ﬂight data (including our ﬁndings speciﬁcally)
for a similar purpose, as independently veriﬁable evidence to support the central
accusations.99
Tracking rendition aircraft can also impact upon attempts to document subsidiary
abuses associated with rendition ﬂights, and to create accountability for those involved
in the rendition process itself. Flight data analysis and associated documentation demon-
strate that several contractors were deeply embedded within the RDI programme, and
clearly aware of the services they were providing for rendition operations.100 Likewise,
ﬂight data conﬁrm that a large number of states provided vital logistical support for oper-
ations, whether allowing prisoners to be embarked upon an aircraft on their territory, allow-
ing a landing of a rendition aircraft with prisoner on board for refuelling, or allowing
rendition aircraft on the way to or from a rendition operation to overﬂy or refuel on their
territory. As a consequence, ﬂight data analysis has played a central role in tort cases
brought by former prisoners against the ﬂight planning company Jeppesen Dataplan101;
in the case of Mohammed al-Asad v. Djibouti at the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights102; in the judicial review brought by Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni
against the United Kingdom (UK) for having allowed his transfer through Diego
Garcia103; in parliamentary investigations into facilitation of renditions in Finland and
Denmark104; and in police investigations into violation of domestic law by countries allow-
ing the refuelling of aircraft rendition on the way to and from rendition operations.105 In
other cases, the withholding of speciﬁc ﬂight data by authorities has directly impacted
upon the ability of victims to seek redress through the court system.106
The impact of this work emphasises the wider value and importance of collaboration
between scholars and human rights investigators in uncovering a range of practices by
states that contravene their commitments under international human rights and humanitar-
ian law. It is partly through the painstaking work undertaken by human rights investigators,
investigative journalists and academics that states can be held to account for the ways in
which they directly contribute to, or are complicit in, counterterrorism operations that
involve substantial human rights violations. Two principles underpin such endeavours:
ﬁrst, an unﬂinching commitment to universal human rights for all, regardless of what an
individual may be suspected of, at all times and in all places; and second, a commitment
to the rigorous deployment of (often experimental) methods to analyse and triangulate an
extensive range of public data, with the aim of uncovering traces of states’ covert practices
so that they may be held to account.
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Appendix A
Table notes
. Dates in all tables refer here to circuit dates (from the date the aircraft ﬁrst left its home base in
the US to the date that it landed back at the same airport).
. Circuits marked with * are those which were known before 2010, but where our discoveries
have provided crucial details.
. Circuits marked with † are those which have been fully identiﬁed as a result of our work.
. Circuits marked with # are combined circuits, involving two aircraft meeting at a third country
in order to disguise the connection between black sites.
. The four-letter codes in [square brackets] next to each location refer to the unique airport iden-
tiﬁer, as laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).
. Some of the ﬂight data for ﬂights into and out of Romania list alternative airports for one leg of
the circuit. In many cases, these discrepancies are likely to be dummy ﬂight plans.
. For further details on each of these circuits, including maps, precise movements and timings for
each leg of the circuit, and invoicing documentation, see the individual circuit analyses
accessed via http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/ﬂights/renditions/index.html.
. For more details of the aircraft connecting European black sites, laid out in Table 1, see http://
www.therenditionproject.org.uk/ﬂights/aircraft/index.html.
Table 1. Rendition aircraft connecting European black sites
• N1HC. Gulfstream IV.
• N248AB. Gulfstream IV.
• N288KA. Gulfstream III.
• N308AB. Gulfstream IV.
• N313P. Boeing 737.
• N379P. Gulfstream V.
• N63MU. Gulfstream IV.
• N724CL. Boeing 727.
• N733MA. Boeing 737.
• N740EH. Boeing 737.
• N787WH. Boeing 737.
• N789DK. Gulfstream III.
• N85VM. Gulfstream IV.
• N860JB. Gulfstream IV.
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Table 3. Flights out of Poland
• 3–7 June 2003, N379P: Szymany, Poland [EPSY] to Rabat, Morocco [GMME].
• 27 July–1 August 2003, N379P: Szymany, Poland [EPSY] to Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB].
• 20–25 September 2003, N313P: Szymany, Poland [EPSY] to Bucharest, Romania [LRBS],
Rabat, Morocco [GMME] and Guantánamo Bay [MUGM].
Table 2. Flights into Poland
• 3–6 December 2002, N63MU: Bangkok, Thailand [VTBD] to Szymany, Poland [EPSY], via
Dubai [OMDM]*
• 6–13 February 2003, N379P: Rabat, Morocco [GMME] to Szymany, Poland [EPSY].
• 1–9 March 2003, N379P: Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB] to Szymany, Poland [EPSY].
• 23–28 March 2003, N379P: Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB] to Szymany, Poland [EPSY].
• 3–7 June 2003, N379P: Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB] to Szymany, Poland [EPSY].
• 27 July–1 August 2003, N379P: Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB] to Szymany, Poland [EPSY].
Table 4. Flights into Romania
• 20–25 September 2003, N313P: Szymany, Poland [EPSY] to Bucharest, Romania [LRBS].
• 15–28 January 2004, N313P: Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB] to Bucharest, Romania [LRBS].
• 25–28 January 2004, N85VM: Amman, Jordan [OJAM] to Bucharest, Romania [LRBS].*
• 11–13 April 2004, N85VM: Guantánamo Bay, Cuba [MUGM] to Bucharest, Romania
[LRBS], via Tenerife [GCXO].*
• 29 July–2 August 2004, N288KA: Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB] to Bucharest, Romania
[LRBS], via Amman, Jordan [OJAM].†
• 29 September–3 October 2004, N85VM: Rabat, Morocco [GMME] to Bucharest, Romania
[LRBS], via Amman, Jordan [OJAM].*
• 14–20 February 2005, N787WH: Rabat, Morocco [GMME] to Bucharest, Romania [LRBS].†
• 23–28 May 2005, N450DR and N308AB:Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB] to Bucharest, Romania
[LRBS], via a plane switch in Amman, Jordan [OJAM].†#
• 18–22 August 2005, N860JB: Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt [HESH] and Kabul, Afghanistan
[OAKB] to Bucharest, Romania [LRBS].†
Table 5. Flights out of Romania
• 24–30 October 2003, N379P: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] toAmman, Jordan [OJAM],Kabul,
Afghanistan [OAKB] and Baghdad, Iraq [ORBI].
• 23–28 August 2004, N308AB: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] to Rabat, Morocco [GMME],
Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB], Amman, Jordan [OJAM], and Algiers, Algeria [DAAG].†
• 17–22 October 2004, N789DK: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] to Amman, Jordan [OJAM] and
Kabul, Afghanistan [OAKB].†
• 14–20 February 2005, N787WH: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] to Palanga, Lithuania [EYPA].†
• 25–29 July 2005, N308AB: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] to Cairo, Egypt [HECA].†
• 1–8 October 2005, N308AB and N787WH: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] to Vilnius, Lithuania
[EYVI], via a plane switch in Tirana, Albania [LATI].†#
• 4–7 November 2005, N1HC and N248AB: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] toKabul, Afghanistan
[OAKB], via a plane switch in Amman, Jordan [OJAM].†#
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Table 6. Flights into Lithuania
• 16–17 February 2005, N724CL: Rabat, Morocco [GMME] to Vilnius, Lithuania [EYVI], via
Amman, Jordan [OJAM].†
• 14–20 February 2005, N787WH: Rabat, Morocco [GMME] to Palanga, Lithuania [EYPA], via
Bucharest, Romania [LRBS].†
• 1–8 October 2005, N308AB and N787WH: Bucharest, Romania [LRBS] to Vilnius, Lithuania
[EYVI], via a plane switch in Tirana, Albania [LATI].†#
Table 7. Flight out of Lithuania
• 23–28 March 2006, N733MA and N740EH: Palanga, Lithuania [EYPA] toKabul, Afghanistan
[OAKB], via a plane switch in Cairo, Egypt [HECA].†#
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